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THE NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS
IN PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS:
THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY
John A.E. Pottow*
I. INTRODUCTION
In fiscal year 2002, approximately 5.8 million Americans borrowed
$38 billion (USD) in federal student loans. This was more than triple
the $11.7 billion borrowed in 1990.' As a rule of thumb, tuition has
been increasing at roughly double the rate of inflation in recent
years.2 This troubling trend of accelerating tuition, coupled with the
fact that real income has stagnated for men and increased only
modestly for women over the past two decades,' means that more
and more students are going to need to turn to borrowed money to
finance their degrees absent a radical restructuring of the post-
secondary education system.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Stephanie
Ben-Ishai, Rich Friedman, Sir Roy Goode, Reshma Jagsi, Elizabeth Warren, Jim
White and Jacob Ziegel for comments and Rita Abro, Trevor Broad, Mike Murphy and
Elizabeth Nestor Haas for research. This paper was developed from a presentation to
the 35th Annual Commercial and Consumer Law Workshop, held at the University of
Toronto Faculty of Law, October 2005; participants there were most helpful too.
I. See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Secretary of Education,
Federal Student Aid: Timely Performance Plans and Reports Would Help Guide and
Assess Achievement of Default Management Goals (GAO-03-348, February 2003),
online at <http://www.gao.gov/htext/d03348.html>.
2. See Trends in College Pricing (CollegeBoard, 2005), online at <http://www.college-
board.comlprod-downloadslpress/costO5/trends-college-pricing-05.pdf> (adding
that while there were relatively large tuition increases at public four-year institutions
in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s, the rate of increase has grown even
higher in the early 2000s).
3. See U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Table P 36, Full-Time, Year-Round All Workers by Median Income and Sex: 1955-
2004, online at <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p36ar.html>. For a
critique of the regressive effects wage stagnation has wrought on the entry of both
spouses into the workforce, see Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two
Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers and Fathers Are Going Broke (New York,
Basic Books, 2003), especially at pp. 49-53.
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Policymakers have paid increasing attention to the problems and
issues surrounding these student loans. Just recently, the U.S.
Congress decided to cut funding to government-funded student loan
programmes to help balance the federal budget deficit.' But what
has been largely unexamined in legal literature is the treatment of
student loan debt in personal bankruptcy proceedings.' This is so
even as a 2005 overhaul to the consumer bankruptcy laws in the
United States added yet another amendment to the student loan
dischargeability provisions.6
Currently, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives student debt the
extraordinary treatment of nondischargeability.7 This means that
unlike all other unsecured debts, student loans do not get discharged
in a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. They survive a filing and
continue to haunt the debtor in his post-bankruptcy life ("staling"
his otherwise "fresh" start). This is harsh and dramatic treatment,
and it is worthy of scholarly attention. This article assembles the
various theories under which student loans could be treated as
nondischargeable in bankruptcy and then subjects them to scrutiny.
It proceeds as follows. Part II recaps the current U.S. law on student
loan treatment in bankruptcy and its convoluted legislative history.
Part III presents six possible theories for treating student loans
as nondischargeable debts in bankruptcy (Fraud, Soft Fraud,
Internalization, Shaming, Public Fisc, and Cost of Private Capital).
Part IV offers a critique of how current law comports with each
of these theories, and how these theories in turn sit with
available empirical data. It concludes by recommending an income-
contingent approach similar to the debt relief programmes used by
several high-tuition law schools in the United States.8
4. See Anne Marie Chaker, "Congress Cuts Funding for Student Loans", Wall Street
Journal, December 22, 2005, at p. Dl (chronicling five-year reduction of $12.7 billion
to federal student loans and raising of federal interest rates on student loans).
5. This is not to say that nothing has been written. Much has, but the focus has been doc-
trinal. See, e.g., Robert E Salvin, "Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start
Policy: Must Debtors Be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?" (1996), 71
Tul. L. Rev. 139. One thoughtful compilation is Richard Fossey and Mark Bateman,
eds., Condemning Students to Debt: College Loans and Public Policy (New York,
Teachers College Press, 1998).
6. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in sections of 11 U.S.C.).
7. See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005).
8. My own law institution, the University of Michigan, has such a programme. It relieves
loan payback for students earning less than $36,000 annually. For more information,
see the explanation online at <http://www.law.umich.edu/currenstudents/
financialaid/debt-management.htm>.
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Part of the inspiration for this article is the comparative study on
post-secondary education financing being undertaken by Canadian
researchers Stephanie Ben-Ishai, lain Ramsey, and Saul Schwartz
("Ben-Ishai"). 9 Their project is an analysis of public student loan
assistance programmes, including their forgiveness regimes, and
the treatment of student loans in bankruptcy in five countries:
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New
Zealand. Indeed, the recommendation that the most compelling
treatment of student loans would involve an income-contingent
approach builds on the regime used in New Zealand (and other
countries).
II. THE U.S. LAW AND HISTORY
The U.S. federal government has a comprehensive system of
directly funded and federally guaranteed (both "subsidized" and
"unsubsidized") student loans, complete with programmes for for-
bearance, deferral and other forms of within-programme relief.'0 Of
more familiarity to those focused on bankruptcy law is the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code's nondischargeability provision (or what might
be termed "conditional dischargeability" provision) of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8). In their most recent listing, freshly revised in October
2005, nondischargeable debts now include:
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would
impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents, for -
(A) (i) an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any program
funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or nonprofit insti-
tution; or
(ii) any obligation to repay funds received as an educational bene-
fit, scholarship, or stipend, or
(B) any other educational loan that is a qualified education expense, as
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
incurred by a debtor who is an individual."
9. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Government Student Loans, Government Debts and
Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study" (2006), 44 C.B.L.J. 211. Ben-Ishai offers some
bankruptcy theory in the background discussion of the most recent publication of her
project's findings, but the study's focus is chiefly comparative. See ibid. My analysis,
unfettered by a grant mandate, has the luxury of being able to explore theoretical con-
siderations in more depth.
10. See the Ben-Ishai Appendix, unpublished in this issue but on file with the author, for
a helpful summary.
I1. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2005). The major change of the 2005 amendments was to
encompass all student loans (see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2005)), not just student
20061
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The history of how student loans became non-dischargeable debt
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is complex and ongoing. After the
Guaranteed Student Loan Program was established under the
Higher Education Act of 1965, perceived over-use of bankruptcy to
discharge government loans led to § 439A of the Education
Amendments of 1976. Section 439A prohibited student loan dis-
charge in bankruptcy until five years had passed after the start of
the repayment period of the loan, except in cases constituting
"undue hardship". 2 In the comprehensive overhaul of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code enacted in 1978, that treatment of student loans
then became addressed under the bankruptcy laws, specifically §
523(a)(8). 3 The full legislative history to § 523(a)(8) (and 439A) is
chronicled in Pardo and Lacey's analysis of 261 student loan dis-
charge motions in reported bankruptcy cases, and so the reader
seeking more historical detail is referred there.14 What is probably
most important to glean is that these nondischargeability provisions
came up at the last minute over the opposition of key legislators.
Both the primary co-sponsor of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (Rep.
Don Edwards) and the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Postsecondary Education who oversaw the Education Amendments
of 1976 (Rep. James O'Hara) objected to the introduction of a stu-
dent loan nondischargeability rule. 15 O'Hara protested bitterly that
Congress was "fighting a 'scandal' which exists primarily in the imag-
ination" and that the amendment "treats educational loans precisely
as the law now treats loans incurred by fraud, felony, and alimony-
dodging".' 6 As a partial victory for Edwards, the nondischargeability
loans made, insured or guaranteed by the government. Note that the curious diction
"debtor and the debtor's dependents" could raise an argument (although it has never
been seriously embraced by the courts) that relief is available only to a debtor who has
dependents.
12. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (codi-
fied at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1976 (repealed 1978)) (hereafter "Education Amendments
of 1976").
13. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 316, 92 Stat. 2549, 2678
(effective October 1, 1979).
14. Rafael I. Pardo and Michelle R. Lacey, "Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts:
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt" (2005), 74 Cin. L.
Rev. 405 (analyzing 286 generated discharge determinations).
15. See ibid., at pp. 419-28 for a more detailed historical discussion of the "long and
tortured" legislative history of II U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Ibid., at p. 421 (quoting
Mallinckrodt v. Chem. Bank (In re Mallinckrodt), 260 B.R. 892, 897 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2001), revd 270 B.R. 560 (S.D. Fla. 2002)).
16. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1232 (1976), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at pp. 147-48
(1977) and in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6108-09. In fairness, part of the blame for dataless
[Vol. 44
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enactment was delayed to accommodate his request for a General
Accounting Office study on the discharge rate of student loans."
Unfortunately, those empirical data, like many empirical data
gathered in Washington, fell on deaf ears. The evidence of a lower
than 1% discharge rate of federally insured student loans in
bankruptcy did not block the nondischargeability provision from
entering the Bankruptcy Code - this even so under a comparatively
liberal Congress that passed the debtor-friendly 1978 overhaul of
the Bankruptcy Code."8
Edwards actually lost both the battle and the war. Since 1978,
Congress has continued to clamp down on the purportedly lenient
treatment of student debt in consumer bankruptcies, passing -
often with comfortable bipartisan majorities - revisions to
§ 523(a)(8) in 1990, 1998 and now 2005. Specifically, in 1990, the
five-year bar was extended to a seven-year bar (reminiscent of the
durational tinkering the Canadians are now agonizing over with Bill
C-55, just as they did with its failed predecessor, Bill C-236 (a
private member's bill), on the waiting period for student loan
discharge).'9 In 1998, the seven-year bar was extended to an
legislative reform falls on the otherwise commendable Bankruptcy Act Commission
of 1970, who worried about the possibility of "potential abuses" notwithstanding the
documented absence of actual abuses. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at p. 176 (1973).
17. The 1976 Education Amendments had a deferred enactment date of September 30,
1977. See Education Amendments of 1976, supra, footnote 13, at § 127(b).
18. The General Accounting Office Report actually persuaded the majority of the House
Judiciary Committee to repeal the proposed nondischargeability of student loans from
the Higher Education Amendments in consolidating the new Bankruptcy Code, and
they submitted a report presenting the General Accounting Office data. See H.R. Rep.
No. 95-595, at pp. 139-47; reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6100-08. The report,
however, got a "dissent" from Rep. Allen E. Ertel who made it something of a mission
to keep the nascent nondischargeabilty provision in the new Bankruptcy Code. See
ibid., at p. 536, U.S.C.C.A.N. at p. 6424, for Rep. Ertel's excoriation of "a law that is
almost specifically designed to encourage fraud" during "a time when political, busi-
ness, and social morality are major issues". Ertel carried the day, and the nondis-
chargeability amendment survived when the new Bankruptcy Code was enacted.
19. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 3261(1), 104 Stat. 4789, 4964-
65 (repealed 1998); Student Loan Default Prevention Initiative Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-28 to 1388-29. The Canadian proposals seek to
amend a ten-year period down to a seven-year period (following an earlier proposal,
in a private member's bill, to bring it down to a two-year period). See An Act to
Amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Bill C-236 (Private Member's Bill), 38th
Parliament, 1st Session 2004-2005 (first reading October 20, 2004); An Act to
Establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to Amend the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, Bill C-55, Ist Sess.,
38th Parl., received Royal Assent November 25, 2005.
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infinite-year bar (that is, student loans are never dischargeable, after
any interval of time, unless undue hardship can be shown) °.2 These
successive legislative restrictions made clear "Congress's intent to
make it harder for a student to shift his debt responsibility onto the
taxpayer".' Most recently, and, from a theoretical perspective, most
troublingly, 2 the 2005 amendments to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code -
overruling the recommendations of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission to scrap nondischargeability 2 - now make
student debt nondischargeable, absent an undue hardship showing,
for debts made by private lenders, not just for federally funded or
guaranteed loans. 4
Thus, the current state of bankruptcy law in the United States is that
student debt, whether private or publicly financed, is nondischarge-
able in personal bankruptcy, with a safety valve for the showing of
undue hardship (with the burden for so showing placed on the debtor).
III. POSSIBLE THEORIES FOR NONDISCHARGEABILITY
U.S. bankruptcy law treats student loans as nondischargeable
debts. Why is that so? There are several plausible theories under
which educational debt should be treated as nondischargeable. In
considering them, it will be helpful to remember that non-
dischargeability is an extraordinary rule,25 often held out for extraor-
dinary debts (such as, for example, an intentional tortfeasor's debt
for a damages or restitution award to her victim).26 Thus a
theory of nondischargeability should make a case for treating
student debt not just harshly, but exceptionally - different from all
other debts. This section explores six such theories.
20. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, § 971, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat.
1581, 1837 (1998).
21. In re Cox, 338 F3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003).
22. The reason this final innovation is so troubling from a theoretical standpoint is that the
extension of protection to private lenders eviscerates one of the plausible justifications
for nondischargeability in the first place (safeguarding the public fisc). See infra, text
accompanying footnotes 68-69.
23. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report, Pub. L. No. 103-394, at 207 (estab-
lished pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994) (October 20, 1997). A former
Republican Congressman, Caldwell Butler, was a chief proponent behind scrapping
nondischargeability as unprincipled and unwarranted.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2005, as revised).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2005) (providing generally for the discharge of unsecured debts).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2005).
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1. Fraud
One long-standing reason for holding bankruptcy debts non-
dischargeable is fraud.27 Accordingly, one theory for subjecting
student loans to a nondischargeability rule is an assumption that
they are presumptively fraudulent. This would in turn assume that
the prototypical student loan debtor - a student - is presumptively
dishonest. Is such distrust of students plausible? Of course it is.
After all, they are quite lazy, they don't cut their hair enough, and
most of them wouldn't recognize eight o'clock in the morning if it
slapped them backside the head.28 No one should trust them. The
reader who might think this exaggeration, or that such stereotypes,
while maybe whispered behind closed doors, would never influence
the law, should consider the Third Circuit's recent admonition to
"account for the fact that one of the most common reasons student-
loan debtors find themselves in bankruptcy court is that their 'sub-
jective value judgements' are often (but not always) indicative of a
spendthrift philosophy".29 Apparently, the judiciary has taken notice
of the dubious financial mores of students.
Fraud, in its strict sense, is a serious allegation. It requires
scienter. 0 To say that a loan is fraudulent is to say, or postulate as a
rule of thumb, that students intend to take out huge sums of money
with no intention whatsoever, from the ex ante perspective, of ever
paying them back. While it may be a dramatic assumption, it is one
that would provide a sound theoretical basis for a nondischarge-
ability rule. Of course, whether it is a warranted assumption is a
separate question. As Rep. O'Hara complained in (unsuccessfully)
fighting the introduction of student loan nondischargeability back in
the 1970s, "No other legitimately contracted consumer loan,
applied to a legitimate undertak[ing] is subjected to the assumption
of criminality which this provision applies to every educational loan."31
27. See Twyne's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 80b-81b, 76 E.R. 809, 811-14, sub nom. Chamberlain v.
Twyne, Moo. K.B. 638, 72 E.R. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
28. Except, of course, those who have yet to retire by that hour. I speak from research, not
experience.
29. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir.
1995).
30. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 (1977) (Conditions under which Misrepresentation
Is Fraudulent (Scienter)).
31. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1232 (1976) and H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at p. 149 (1977). It is
unsurprising that Rep. O'Hara called the provision "discriminatory".
20061
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A final, empirical point is critical for making student loans
nondischargeable under a strict fraud theory. The Bankruptcy Code
already has anti-fraud provisions, such as § 523(a)(2),32 that
expressly exempt from discharge debts incurred through fraud. For
the presumption of fraud unique to student loans under § 523(a)(8),
one must be making further empirical claims: perhaps that students
are an especially likely group to engage in financial fraud and/or
that they are an especially competent group of tricksters, making
their fraud more difficult to detect than that of others. Such an
account would explain the need for a special presumption of fraud
when the debtors are students above and beyond § 523(a)(2).
Needless to say, this piles empirical supposition upon empirical
supposition, and Congress is already on shaky ground regarding
empirical data and bankruptcy legislation. But this reasoning is the
only way to make sense of a student loan nondischargeability pro-
vision if the underlying concern truly is the traditional one of fraud.
It may not be persuasive, of course, but it is at least a theoretically
articulable rationale for nondischargeability.
2. Soft Fraud
A more likely fraud-animated foundation for nondischargeability
of student debt is what might be called "soft fraud", although that is
an imperfect label. "Opportunism" also captures the concern, but
that too is problematic because "opportunism" is a notoriously
amorphous concept in bankruptcy. One man's shrewd financial
planning around the contours of the law is another's shameless
abuse of the spirit and intent of safeguards that provide succor to the
"honest but unfortunate" debtor so prototypical to judicial opinions
deciding in the debtor's favor.33 "Opportunism" also invokes the
always nettlesome role of morality in insolvency laws, a complex
topic that will never go away, to the ongoing frustration of econo-
mists.34 In any event, the opportunism concern of "soft" fraud is as
follows: Perhaps without the malice aforethought of traditional
fraud, Student takes out a six-figure loan to finance her undergraduate
and graduate education. (Commonwealth readers may shudder that
this debt load is not uncommon for newly minted lawyers in the
32. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
33. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing Williams v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (1915)) (deciding in favor of debtor),
34. "Moral hazard" might also do as a label.
[Vol. 44
Nondischargeability of Student Loans 253
United States.)35 Her first year out into the real world, however, hard-
ens her. She realizes she faces the prospect of amortizing a multi-
decade loan, when she has few personal assets to her name other
than well-highlighted law books. She has no appreciable savings (as
a rational life cycle consumer, she had no inclination to accrue them
yet), no home, and perhaps a beat-up car at best. But she has lots of
difficult-to-monetize, let alone liquidate, human capital in the form
of her J.D. degree.36 Recognizing that the price exchanged for the
bankruptcy discharge is giving up all her non-exempt assets, she
happily trades in the car for unfettered access to that high future
income stream. There is a perverse temporal arbitrage of sorts. She
gets to pick her debt relief at the point in time when her realizable
assets and present income are at their lowest and her debt and future
income are at their highest. Her impecunity is transient and arguably
artificial.
Does likening this rational economic behavior to fraud seem hyper-
bolic? No, this scenario is cast as fraud frequently. Consider the
comments of Rep. Ertel, nondischargeability's champion: "At a time
when political, business, and social morality are major issues, it is
dangerous to enact a law that is almost specifically designed to
encourage fraud." He summed up his support for nondischargeability:
If Student A elects to repay the loan, honoring the legal and moral obligation
that was incurred, he begins his career with a substantial debt and the
accompanying financial pressure. Meanwhile Student B (who chooses to
declare bankruptcy) can begin with a clean slate and is free to spend his ini-
tial earnings on other items... The lesson that Student A and B have learned
is that it "does not pay" to honor one's debts or other legal obligations.37
Hence it is the buy-low, sell-high opportunism that is begrudged
by proponents of nondischargeablity. Indeed, the concern is not
unique to Americans. Ben-Ishai reports similar sentiments from
Canadian politicians, such as, "We are trying to avoid situations
where someone declares bankruptcy simply to get rid of their [sic]
student loan and then finds a job."3
35. Again, using my own institution, the University of Michigan, as an example, recent
tuition for law school (a three-year graduate degree) was $35,920 per year ($32,920
for Michigan residents).
36. Difficult does not mean impossible. See infra, footnote 44.
37. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at p. 536, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5424.
38. Canada, Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade
and Commerce Issue 13 - Evidence (November 4, 1996) (Mr. Tobin), discussed in
Ben-lshai, supra, footnote 9, at p. 228.
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The concern must be more than just a fear of opportunism per se.
Many debts incurred can be more or less reduced to this reasoning
of opportunistic discharge in bankruptcy. In fact, in business, far
from being disparaged as fomenting "opportunism", the bankruptcy
discharge is styled as fostering "entrepreneurialism".39 So, again,
there must be something specific to student loans that raises the
spectre of abuse in justifying a nondischarge rule. What distin-
guishes student loans from other debts, vis- -vis opportunism?
First, the debtors are students, so they are usually (but not always)
young. That means they have more earning years to repay their
debts than the median consumer debtor, who in the United States
according to most recent data is in his late thirties.' Second, the
debt's proceeds are special. Educational debt in part reflects per-
sonal investment in future earning potential. Students will be able
to realize the benefit of education and translate that benefit
into financial payoff." There is no serious doubt of the
correlation between education and income. 2 It is thus unsurprising
39. See Wei Fan and Michelle White, "Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of
Entrepreneurial Activity" (2003), 46 J.L. & Econ. 543 (finding correlation between
discharge leniency and entrepreneurial activity). Note that even the increasing domi-
nance of a blanket security interest (see Jay L. Westbrook, "The Control of Wealth in
Bankruptcy" (2004), 82 Tex. L. Rev. 795) does not squelch this trend entirely due to
the pervasiveness of unsecured credit in small business financing: see Ronald J. Mann,
"The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending"(1997), 86 Georgetown L.J. 1.
40. See Consumer Bankruptcy Project 111 (2001 empirical study spearheaded by
Professors Elizabeth Warren, Jay L. Westbrook and Teresa A. Sullivan). Data on file
with author. For more information about the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, see
Warren and Tyagi, supra, footnote 3.
41. This is not always so, as a recent academic study revealed an ugly trend of selling to
low-income vocational workers educational courses that generate no substantial
income-improving possibilities. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at p. 41 and
note 211, discussing a large number of bankrupted former "students" who did not even
earn an undergraduate degree. This problem may be a recurrence of an earlier trend
that led to Senate investigations and ultimate accreditation crackdowns on certain for-
profit vocational schools. See Jodi L. Edelson, "Higher Education to Higher Default:
A Re-Examination of the Guaranteed Student Loan Program" (1992), 11 Ann. Rev. of
Bankr. L. 475 at p. 483 and note 62 (discussing Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Comm. on Gov't Affairs, Abuses in the Federal Student Aid
Programs, S. Rep. No. 58, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1991)). I myself recently
received an urgent message advising that "no one is turned down" for degrees from
"prestigious non-accredited [sic] universities." (unsolicited e-mail to author, April 18,
2006).
42. See, e.g., Thomas Lemieux, Post-Secondary Education and Increasing Wage
Inequality, NBER Working Paper No. W12077 (May 2006) (ssrn.com abstract =
888279).
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that doctors and lawyers fit well into the myth of the "abusive"
student debtor. (Few rail against abusive teachers.)43 Finally, there is
inalienability. It is difficult to divest the debtor of an educational
benefit ex post. Liquidation of an M.D. degree would be an unruly
affair, and few if any jurisdictions allow licences to practice medi-
cine to be assignable."'
These potentially unique features of educational debt vis-A-vis
opportunism are simply the starting point to a possible theory of
nondischargeability. They should not be seen as a description of
reality. Indeed, if anything there seems to be a documented lack of
empirical evidence supporting routine abuse by rich-career students
using bankruptcy just out of school. The General Accounting Office
study, for example, found only seven attorneys and five doctors of
the 411 employed debtors. 45 The myth is seductive and persistent,
however, perhaps revealing an under-current of American paranoia
that we are all suckers and that rich guy down the street is getting
ahead by gaming the system. Moreover, a certain circularity of reason-
ing renders near-impossible complete conversion of sceptics.
Naysayers can seize Pardo and Lacey's data to "prove" that non-
dischargeability works and that were § 523(a)(8) absent, legions more
doctors and lawyers would be clogging the bankruptcy courts.4 But let
us defer critique. For now, the task is simply to lay out articulable
theoretical foundations for treating student loans as nondischargeable in
a bankruptcy system. Here, it is that student loans are subject to "oppor-
tunistic" discharge in bankruptcy due to their unique characteristics.
43. But cf In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003) (excoriating and denying discharge
to cellist). Cellists are poor in an economic sense but in a sociological sense probably
enjoy a relatively high occupation prestige ranking. Under the 1980 census occupa-
tional code categories, "musicians" were scored 47 in 1989, putting them on par with
"public relations specialists" (48), well below "law teachers" (74), but well above
"cashiers" (29). See National Opinion Research Centre: General Social Survey
Codebook, Appendix F, 1980 Census Occupational Category, online at
<http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edulGss/>. This discussion's analysis will stay focused on
the economic perspective.
44. Note that it is not impossible. Family law sometimes must monetize in divorce cases
the value of a professional degree. See, e.g, Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d
332 (Mich. App. 1983).
45. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at p. 143, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6104.
Pardo and Lacey found 13 lawyers with a median reported income of $32,500 in 2003
dollars in their 261 motions. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at p. 41.
46. A reply to this argument is that § 523(a)(8) motions are for discretionary relief for
undue hardship, so there is nothing in existing law that stops doctors and lawyers from
bringing them now, as the eight reported cases did.
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3. Internalization
It is admittedly difficult to carve out discrete justifications for
student debt treatment in bankruptcy, because many reasons over-
lap. Nevertheless, a separate but related ground to opportunism for
treating student loans as nondischargeable can be thought of as
"internalization". This theory builds on the notion that the recipient
of a private benefit (here, education) should have to bear its cost
(here, the debt for tuition).47 Again, this argument can be extra-
polated to almost all debts, so one must further find something
distinctive about education in particular that makes internalization
a special concern.
First of all, what are the private benefits of education conferred
upon the recipient? There are at least two that come to mind. First,
there is the simple enjoyment ("subjective utility" in economic parl-
ance) of engaging in a purely intellectual endeavor for several
years. That may well be important, but academics probably accord
it disproportionate focus. The more tawdry and tangible private
benefit to education is, as alluded to above, the financial empower-
ment of heightened earning potential that attends a post-secondary
degree. Most of the public rhetoric seems targeted at this sort of
benefit, likely because it ties closely with the financial opportunism
of quickly discharging the educational debt incurred to achieve it.
For example, in the recent Rae Review in Canada, the Hon. Bob
Rae, in advocating the ability of universities to set their own
(higher) tuition rates - and to require loans for students to help pay
those higher rates - reasoned that there is "an important private
benefit to the student and the graduate [to education and attending
university]. It is only reasonable for students to pay part of the cost.
Otherwise we would be asking the taxpayers who don't go to sub-
sidize those who do." 8 This language repeats an idea articulated by
47. Obviously, by publicly subsidizing the student loans programme in the United States,
some costs are "externalized" by deliberate social intervention - the subsidy. The
argument here is that excessive bankruptcy discharge is an unfair "over-subsidy" that
allows, effectively, free education where the legislator wanted only loan-subsidized
education. The perceived socially optimal level of activity is overshot.
48. Bob Rae, Postsecondary Review: Higher Expectations for Higher Learning (report
and recommendations submitted to the Premier by the Minister of Training, Colleges
and Universities, February 2005) at p. 24 (hereafter "Rae Review"). I am deliberately
taking Rae's comments out of context. He prefaces his comments by recognizing the
"significant social benefit" of education: ibid., at p. 23.
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Australian politicians when tuition fees were introduced to students
in 1989."9
It is therefore understandable that if one envisions education as a
private benefit, and specifically one that accords financial gain, then
one may legitimately worry about the spectre of opportunism and
externalization. If tuition debt is publicly subsidized and then dis-
charged, the benefit is realized privately but the cost is shifted back
to the public. 0 Indeed, some enthusiasts of "constructing"'" educa-
tion as a private benefit go even further. Here, it is not even higher
earning, but the chance for higher earning, that is the private bene-
fit of education. The unsuccessful lawyer must bear that cost just as
much as the successful one, lest the taxpayer fall into the role of
guarantor of financial success (of lawyers!). 2 At the furthest
extreme, some even begrudge education that has no potential to
translate into a lucrative career. For them, "nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code suggests that a debtor may choose to work only
in a field in which he was trained, obtain a low-paying job, and then
claim it would be an undue hardship to repay his loans". 3 Taking
aim at musicians, such as the principal cellist of the Louisiana
Philharmonic Orchestra who brought the unsuccessful discharge
motion that generated the preceding pronouncement, one court
worried that otherwise "it is difficult to imagine a professional
orchestra musician who would not qualify for an undue hardship
discharge"."
49. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at p. 232 (citing A. Usher, Much Ado About a Very
Small Idea: Straight Talk on Income Contingent Loans (Toronto, Educational Policy
Institute, 2005), at p. 3, online at: <http://www.educationalpolicy.org/pdf/IcR.pdf>).
50. Perhaps one might consider the public as having an equitable lien on the degree.
51. This is Ben-Ishai's term, which is exactly right - it is a choice of how to conceptual-
ize education. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at p. 237.
52. See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993), quoted in text, infra, at footnote
58. These cases seem to sidestep the difficult moral issues involved in "exogenous"
career failure. For example, are the purposes of educational debt nondischargeability
engaged or perverted when an elite law school student graduates with ample debts but
then falls victim to mental illness that restricts her earning capacity? See Reynolds v.
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 425 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (upholding mentally ill debtor's discharge for law school debt notwithstanding
discretionary income because repayment of debt over time would so compromise
debtor's mental functioning as to constitute an undue hardship), cert. denied 2006 U.S.
Lexis 5716.
53. In re Gerhardt, 348 F.3d at 93 (per Edith Jones J.).
54. Ibid. Jones J.'s opinion for the court contained neither outrage that it costs $77,000 to
be trained as a principal cellist for a major orchestra but the position can only generate
$1,680 in monthly wages, nor a call for greater subsidies for symphonic orchestras. It
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Talking about the private benefits of education draws into its
sharpest relief the comparative nature of the Ben-Ishai survey.
While Ben-Ishai generally sees convergence across legal regimes
(which to be sure there is),55 from the American vantage point it is
actually the conceptualization of higher education as a public, or
even predominately public, as opposed to private benefit that seems
most jarring. In the United States, talk of the public benefit of higher
education - or even the positive externalities associated with the
private benefit of higher education - is notoriously absent from the
bankruptcy jurisprudence. 6 Instead, one sees comments preoccupied
with the monetization of degrees, complete with finance jargon, to
the exclusion of a broader social understanding of education.
Consider as an example, the Seventh Circuit's LBO analysis:
The government is not twisting the arms of potential students. The decision
whether or not to borrow for a college education lies with the individual;
absent an expression to the contrary, the government does not guarantee the
student's future financial success. If the leveraged investment of an education
does not generate the return the borrower anticipated, the student, not the tax-
payers, must accept the consequences of the decision to borrow.
57
This stands in stark contrast to the Commonwealth. The jaws of
most American readers would drop (and, if one assumes that they
are academics, and hence very likely to be university graduates,
did, however, fault Gerhardt for not being creative and choosing to work, for example,
as a night-school teacher or a music store clerk. See ibid., at pp. 92-93 and note 4.
55. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 215 and 224-26.
56. This is not to say that the idea of education as a public benefit is absent from American
academic discourse. For a seminal example, see Burton A. Weisbrod, External
Benefits of Public Education (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962). It is the
courts who seem to give it short shrift. By contrast, economists seem quite excited of
late about isolating and quantifying the externalities of education. See, e.g., A. Ciccone
and G. Pei, "Identifying Human Capital: Theory with Applications" (2006), 73 Rev.
Econ. Stud. 381; E. Moretti, "Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education's
Evidence from Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data" (2004), 121 J. of
Econometrics 175; D. Acemoglo and J. Angrist, "How Large Are the Social Returns
to Education: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws" in Ben Bernanke and
Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2000, pp. 9-59. For an interesting
recent treatment disaggregating secondary education effects from post-secondary edu-
cation effects (on the theory of imperfectly substitutable skilled/unskilled workers as
factors of production), see S. Iranzo and G. Peri, "Schooling Externalities, Technology
and Productivity: Theory and Evidence from U.S. States", NBER Working Paper Series
No. 12440 (2006), online at <www.NBER.org/papers/w12440> (measuring externali-
ties as change in total factor productivity net of wages in finding significant social
returns to post-secondary education but not average education levels).
57. In re Roberson, supra, footnote 53, at p. 1137.
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drop with jealousy) upon learning that Australia did not even charge
students tuition until 1989. 58 Similarly, in Canada, the February
2005 Rae Review presented the seemingly bold idea that student
tuition should be vastly increased, decoupled from its utility-like
government regulation, and that students should be required to
incur (albeit publicly subsidized and guaranteed) debt to help afford
it. In fact, the quotation from the Rae Review above, used to illus-
trate a private construction of education, actually began with the
prefatory admonition that "there is unquestionably a significant
social benefit to higher education that should be recognized by a
stronger commitment to public funding". 9 Accordingly, while Ben-
Ishai suggests convergence, there may actually be two sharply
divergent starting points, which may well reflect deeper normative
differences regarding the role of higher education within society.'
Thus if, but only if, higher education is conceived as a private
benefit that inures exclusively or predominately to the student, and
if its cost is publicly subsidized, then an internalization argument can
be made to anchor another possible theory of nondischargeability.6'
4. Shaming
This articulation of theories strives to be comprehensive, so it should
also add the expressive, normative reason for refusing to discharge stu-
dent debts: shaming. Treatment may be brief, however, because it is
doubtful that this model grounds the justification for the student loan
nondischarge.62 It nevertheless deserves a place at the table as a logi-
cally coherent rationale. The argument is that students fall into a class
of morally deficient debtors whom society wants to stigmatize and
punish for non-economic reasons. Indeed, as mentioned, a paradigmatic
58. See supra, footnote 49.
59. Rae Review, supra, footnote 48, at p. 23.
60. Indeed, with the United States' most recent crack-down on students in the 2005
amendments, Canada, to the extent it is "converging" on a U.S. approach, is actually
chasing a moving target that is drifting further away from the status quo.
61. Again, this argument could be applied to many other unsecured debts.
62. This would have to be "special" shame, above and beyond the baseline indignity of
filing for bankruptcy. See Udo Reifner, Johanna Kielsilainen, Nik Huls and Helga
Springeneer, Consumer Overindebtedness and Consumer Law in the European Union:
Final Report (2003) (Contract Ref. No. B5-1000/02/000353 to the Commission of the
European Union Communities, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-
General), at p. 66 (discussing feelings of "guilt and shame" debtors have in filing for
insolvency and how some creditors prefer to exploit this in pressing for publicized,
statutory adjustments of debts over voluntary arrangements).
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nondischargeable debt is the intentional tortfeasor's.63 This is not
premised on economic arguments of cost-spreading (there is little to
suggest that negligent tort victims can cost-spread or insure any better
than intentional tort victims) or other traditional arguments that justify
priority and nondischargeability rules. Rather, it is an expression of the
special disgust society has in using the bankruptcy system - that finds
its origin in equity - to leave the tort victim without recovery in the
service of a fresh start for her malicious tortfeasor. Clean hands are
required for the discharge accorded the "honest but unfortunate
debtor".
Note that despite recent political rhetoric, 64 stigma is alive and
well in insolvency - such as in Australia, where adjudicated bank-
rupts cannot leave the country without written permission and are
barred from governing corporations." So could it be that society
wants to single out students in particular for special shame in falling
into financial ruin and that a desire for disapprobation explains the
current Bankruptcy Code's treatment? Consider New Zealand, an
otherwise student-friendly jurisdiction. It specifically punishes
bankrupt student debtors by barring them from getting more money
from the government student loan programme, thus taking legal
pains to prescribe student-specific bankruptcy prohibitions.66
Nevertheless, a desire to shame students through the bankruptcy
system as special scourges seems an unlikely, if arguably possible,
theoretical basis for a nondischargeability rule.67
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). ("[D]ischarge... does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt ... for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to
the property of another entity.").
64. See infra, footnote 110 (comments of Sen. Sessions).
65. See the Appendix to the Ben-Ishai article (unpublished in this journal, on file with
author), citing Australian authorities.
66. See ibid. (citing New Zealand authorities). This punishment is targeted specifically at
student debtors because presumably only student debtors want access to and are eligi-
ble for student loans.
67. Shaming is an unlikely explanation because the 1978 Code had as one of its objectives
reducing the stigma attached to bankrupt debtors. For example, it deliberately replaced
the term for the petitioner from "bankrupt" to "debtor" as a "means of reducing the
stigma associated with the term bankrupt". See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at p. 310
(1977). On the other hand, a "soft" shaming - or perhaps a "jealousy" - point could
be read into the student loan rules: that they come out of irritation with students who
pursue high-cost degrees not because they are necessary to get low-income jobs, but
because they are preferred to lower cost degrees at "lesser" schools that could provide
sufficient training for the same jobs. See generally Robert Tomsho, "Saying 'No' to
the Ivy League: Families Face Tough Choice as Back-Up Schools Boost Merit Aid for
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5. Public Fisc
A wholly different justification for treating student loans as
nondischargeable in bankruptcy proceedings is couched in terms of
"protecting" the solvency of the public student loan programme,
which is perceived to be in a crisis. 61 It is usually cast in terms of
incentives. It starts with the premise that the default and write-off
rates of these loans will presumably have some negative correlation
with the attractiveness to the debtor of how those loans are treated
in bankruptcy, at least to the extent of some endogenous component
to the decision to file bankruptcy (i.e., to the extent one "chooses"
and is not completely "forced" by exogenous forces to file bank-
ruptcy). If bankruptcy law treats student loans leniently, then more
students at the margin will be inclined to "take bankruptcy" and dis-
charge their loans. And if more students discharge their federally
insured loans in bankruptcy, then more federal dollars will be
devoted to bailing out failed loans (and reimbursing guaranteed
lenders) than might otherwise be devoted to making initial loans to
new students. Here, bankruptcy policy becomes an indirect lever for
education policy. If bankruptcy policy can be altered to make it
harder to default on student loans (e.g., changing otherwise dis-
chargeable debts to become nondischargeable), then incentives will
change. Presumably the default rate on the loan portfolio as a
whole, or at the very least the write-off rate of those loans in bank-
ruptcy, can be diminished, freeing up scarce government dollars for
new students and new loans. The theory finds a cognate in some of
the traditional law and economic analysis of the role corporate
bankruptcy law can play in the cost of private capital.69 While it
rests in part upon an important assumption regarding the volitional
nature of filing for bankruptcy that is subject to some debate, it is at
least an internally coherent account of nondischargeability.
6. Cost of Private Capital
There is a final theoretical basis for treating student loans as
nondischargeable in bankruptcy, and it is one that seems not to be
Top Students", Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2006, p. D. 1. This is a possible non-eco-
nomic interpretation, but it seems to cut against the access-opening animation of guar-
anteed student loans in the first place: that the poor should be able to attend institu-
tions previously accessible only to the rich.
68. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 229-31.
69. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, "A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy" (2005), 91
Va. L. Rev. 1199.
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discussed much. It hearkens back to the economic point just implied
regarding the insolvency-state payoff to the lender.7" If an otherwise
dischargeable unsecured debt is rendered nondischargeable by the
law, then the bankruptcy-state scenario regarding that debt becomes
worse for the debtor (it does not go away) and better for the lender
(it does not go away). In a world of competitive, zero-profit lending
markets, this increased payoff for the lender must be translated
ex ante into an improved cost of capital for the borrower. Without
addressing the empirical likelihood of this competition, it suffices
to observe that making bankruptcy harsher for the debtor, at least
from the standpoint of economic theory, makes borrowing more
affordable for that debtor in particular and all borrowers generally
(especially in a world where it is difficult or expensive to distin-
guish good from bad borrowers up front). While this theory for
nondischargeability is similar to the prior discussion of the publicly
funded student loan programme, it has a key difference. With the
subsidized public programme, one assumes finite apportioned
capital from a legislature, or at the very least one assumes political
constraints on budgetary prioritization. By contrast, with a robust
private lending market, one can assume a bountiful capital supply
available for loans. Recall that in the public student loan market,
interest rates are set in a tariff-like structure and mandated by fed-
eral entities that impose restrictions on loan terms and are subject to
financial constraints.7' (To be sure, the rates float as a function of
benchmark market interest rates, but the adjustment from the desig-
nated index rate has traditionally been fixed.)72 In the purely private
market, the economic consequence of increasing bankruptcy dis-
charges of loans should be for lenders to price up their interest rates
(which they can do in a free market, unconstrained by government
tariff regulation), or to credit ration or exit the market
altogether. Thus nondischargeability could be justified as an
attempt to make private loans "cheaper" for students.73
70. Ibid. The discussion in the text explores only supply; there could be countervailing
considerations of demand.
71. For an example of a loan term restriction, see 20 U.S.C. § 1087(d) ("If a student on
whose behalf a parent has received a loan described in section 428B [20 U.S.C.S. §
1078-2] dies, then the Secretary shall discharge the borrower's liability on the loan by
repaying the amount owed on the loan.").
72. See Chaker, supra, footnote 4, at p. D1. Note, however, that Congress has just voted to
change the interest rates to move away from the index-based formula somewhat: ibid.
73. The same logic taken to its extreme counsels allowing the debtor to become even
better off by pledging a pound of flesh as security. See generally William Shakespeare,
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This economic argument cannot be limited to educational loans.
All loans would follow this logic. So it may prove a difficult basis
for justifying a special rule of nondischargeability for student debt.
But it is theoretically sound if one wants to make only a certain type
of debt (here, student loans) cheaper and comparatively more
attractive than other debt (for example, consumer credit card loans).
If one relaxes the assumption of competitive credit markets,
however,74 then nondischargeability turns from a purportedly
student-friendly provision into an easy way for a creditor to
enhance his return by tinkering with the bankruptcy laws. It is
therefore not surprising that many private creditor constituencies
jockey for nondischargeability status when bankruptcy laws get
amended (which public choice scholars will remind is easier for
concentrated, focused groups to do).75 For example, when an
amendment to expand nondischargeability to for-profit student loan
lenders was first proposed (unsuccessfully) in the 1978 Code, a dis-
pleased group of non-educational creditors grumbled that "this
proposed change simply suggests that if sufficient political pressure
can be generated, a special interest group can obtain special
treatment under the bankruptcy law".76 This public choice grievance of
lobbying run amok was levied by the American Bankers Association
and Consumer Bankers Association Task Forces on Bankruptcy. That
is correct: the banker's associations complained about the ability of
private interest groups to co-opt the Bankruptcy Code.77
7. Second-Order Considerations
The foregoing discussion presented an array of plausible theoreti-
cal foundations for treating student loans as nondischargeable in
The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I (applying doctrine of contra proferentum in
collection proceedings).
74. Or if one questions the ability of the insolvency-state payoff to affect ex ante conduct
in a meaningful way. See Ronald J. Mann, "Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of
Secured Debt" (1997), 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159 at p. 242 (quoting interviewed bank offi-
cer as saying bankruptcy does not matter "one iota" to how banks initiate loans).
75. See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation,
and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982). For legal application,
see Einer R. Elhauge, "Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?" (1991), 101 Yale L.J. 31 at p. 43.
76. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at p. 150 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6111,
quoted in Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at p. 239 (internal citations omitted).
77. I think it is fair to say they got the last laugh. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2005, as
revised).
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personal bankruptcy proceedings. A brief "second-order" analysis is
also warranted regarding administration. One could accept (or
reject) any number of the prior justifications for exceptional treat-
ment of educational debt in bankruptcy but then quarrel over how
best to implement the chosen theory in drafting the law. What is
striking about the U.S. system, especially in light of the recent shift
toward the rule-based discretion-stripping of bankruptcy judges,78 is
the express grant of discretion to judges to adjudicate student-loan
dischargeability motions under § 523(a)(8). For purposes of
simplicity, student debt has been called nondischargeable in this
article. In actuality, it is conditionally dischargeable: the judge may
discharge the debt if she determines that failing to discharge it
would impose an "undue hardship" on the debtor.79 Why, one must
wonder, would Congress leave such an open-ended grant of discre-
tion for the judge to wrestle with and an undefined standard for the
courts to fill in?8" And why, if any (or all) of the justifications for
making student loans nondischargeable hold sway, would Congress
want to back-pedal by allowing a judicial "out" from nondischarge-
ability? Could it be that Congress got cold feet with its seeming
tough talk on student debtors? Could it be a legislative recognition
of the cognitive imperfections that might lead student borrowers to
overestimate their capacity to repay extensive debts? Could it
reflect a last-minute realpolitik compromise? Or could it just be an
aversion to bright-line rules in a legal system originated in equity?8"
The curiously open-ended operation of § 523(a)(8) doubtless ani-
mated Pardo and Lacey's empirical investigation into 261 reported
decisions involving undue hardship motions. Their analysis pro-
duced several findings worth mention. First, about half of the
motions were granted.82 Therefore at the outset, when considering
78. See ibid.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(8).
80. And fill it in the courts have. The reigning "undue hardship" test is a three-pronged
one announced in Brunner v. New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp, 832 E2d 395 (2d
Cir. 1987) (minimal standard of living, persistent state of affairs and good faith attempt
to pay).
81. It bears remembering that the undue hardship test has been around since there was a
time-lapse rule of only five years for discharging student debt. So if there were cold
feet, they started out especially cold, where even five years seemed too harsh a bar to
impose without a safety valve.
82. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at p. 70 (reporting 45.5% rate of "undue
hardship" findings and 57% rate of at least some granted relief).
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the purportedly nondischargeable nature of student debt in the
United States, one must realize that a non-trivial amount of it does,
in fact, get discharged in bankruptcy.83 Second, there is disquieting
randomness in the application of the undue hardship standard,
notwithstanding the doctrinal tests various appellate courts have
propounded to try to routinize the enquiry.' When dividing the
debtors into the group whose debts were discharged vs. not dis-
charged, Pardo and Lacey were hard-pressed to find significant
demographic differences (with an exception involving work-limiting
medical conditions, which correlated positively with granting
undue hardship discharge).85 Third, a disjunct exists with respect to
evidence and analysis, with courts often denying discharge if they
determined that there was a current or future ability to repay the
loan, but not always analysing the debtor's financial situation in
coming to such conclusions.86 Finally, judges' opinions on whether
a given debtor received a financial benefit from his education
correlated with their assessments of whether that debtor had a future
ability to repay the debt (and hence would not face undue hard-
ship).87 The data gathered by Pardo and Lacey thus present a mixed
bag of conclusions regarding how § 523(a)(8) works on the ground.
On the one hand, they show judges trying to use principled criteria,
such as perceived future ability to pay. On the other hand, statistical
analysis suggests some arbitrary implementation by even well-
meaning judges. At the very least, their data should give pause with
a judicially administered, ex post-focused system, whatever its
underlying justificatory rationale.
IV. CRITIQUE AND RECOMMENDATION
Having explored the various theories under which student debt
should be treated as nondischargeable in bankruptcy, the next task
is to critique these theories and gauge how well the regime in the
United States comports with any of them.
83. This observation implicitly assumes no relevant selection bias in the cases that get to
the reported decision stage. That is, presumably there were a large number of clear los-
ers in which debtors never bothered to make motions for relief, just as there were a
large number of clear winners in which a motion was made and left unopposed (or
deemed unworthy of publication).
84. See, e.g., Brunner 832 F.2d 395; In re Long, 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
85. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at pp. 71, 77 and Table 8.
86. See ibid., at p. 93.
87. See ibid., at p. 96 and Table 13.
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First, with regard to the hard fraud theory, the current provisions
of § 523(a)(8) seem well designed. They expressly target student
debtors for discriminatory treatment for their presumptively fraud-
ulent behaviour. The fatal problem is that there are no compelling
empirical data to buttress the myth that students defraud creditors
any more than other debtors.88 Thus hard fraud becomes difficult to
take to heart as the theoretical foundation of the nondischargeability
rule. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the seminal General Accounting
Office study from the 1970s indicated a lower than 1% bankruptcy
rate for student debtors.89 Furthermore, as also mentioned earlier, a
special rule for student loan fraud does not even make sense; it is
redundant with the general anti-fraud injunction of § 523(a)(2), and
there has been no documented infirmity with § 523(a)(2) as a
mechanism to police fraudulently incurred debt.
But what of the "softer" fraud - the idea of exploitative oppor-
tunism, where students rack up huge educational debts only to waltz
into bankruptcy the day after graduation? Here, unlike the hard
fraud scenario, the underlying justification is more convincing,
especially when coupled with the closely related "internalization"
theory that those receiving a private benefit should maximally bear
its cost. Bankruptcy's discharge appearing as a seductive siren to a
graduate receiving a $100,000 promissory note with her diploma is
surely a more compelling concern than an undifferentiated allega-
tion that students are dishonest. Indeed, it is this example that
politicians invoke repeatedly when galvanizing support for non-
dischargeability. 9
The problem with "soft fraud" or "opportunism" is not so much
with the justification (as a theoretical matter at least - it leaves
much to be desired from an empirical perspective) as it is with its
execution. The U.S. Code approach, for example, is insupportably
overbroad. To wit, if the animating concern with opportunism is
with a "rich" (or, more precisely, "soon to be rich") debtor getting
off the hook under a false fagade of poverty, then a rationally
88. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 234-36. To be sure, there are no compelling
empirical data for many issues on which Congress legislates. But this was not gay
marriage. This was Congress deciding to "crack down" financially on what in all like-
lihood was a fictitious problem - even, remarkably, in the face of a General
Accounting Office finding showing a low level of student default. See infra, footnote
89.
89. See General Accounting Office Report, H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, supra, footnote 18.
90. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 227-28.
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tailored legal response would be one that took express account of
this earning potential and separated the rich from the poor - an
"income-contingent" model of discharge. 9' Regrettably (and regres-
sively), the U.S. Code makes no formal adjustments for income
regarding nondischargeability in bankruptcy.
This is where the comparative analysis of the Ben-Ishai study
brings helpful perspective. In contrast to the U.S. (and Canadian)
mortgage-style regimes, which treat student debt as a lump-sum
outlay that gets capitalized at graduation and then amortized over
fixed-period installment payments, countries such as Australia
and New Zealand (and recently, the United Kingdom) have
embraced an income-contingent model. Repayment of student
debt is a variable endeavor, and a repayment "tithe" is determined
by a percentage of the debtor's income.92 Under income-
contingent systems, the more a debtor earns, the more she pays
toward her government-funded student debt. Poorer debtors keep
paying too, of course, but with some far-off forgiveness sunset.93
In fact, so routinized is the process that in Australia, recoupment
is assigned to the tax collector, and relief for hardship is
sought through administrative tax hearings rather than judicial
process.9
There is much to commend these regimes as better capturing a
theory of anti-opportunism. If the true underlying motivation for
student debt nondischargeability is translation of the educational
benefit received into a higher income stream for the erstwhile stu-
dent, then surely the better path is one that is sensitive to whether
that income stream has, in fact, materialized. Indeed, consistent
with this approach, Australia subsidizes law degrees by $1,472 and
agricultural ones by $15,966, suggesting, if one assumes that
education in agriculture is not multiple times more expensive than
91. Note that the income-contingent repayment option of the William D. Ford Federal
Direct Loan Program allows debtors to discharge their debts after 25 years of payment
on an income-contingent plan indexed to the poverty level. For a discussion of the pro-
gramme, see, e.g., In re Pena, 155 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998). The programme's
official website at the U.S. Department of Education is <http://www.ed.gov/pro-
grams/wdffdl/index.html>.
92. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 240-43.
93. In the United Kingdom, it used to be age 65, but under recent amendments it is now
after 25 years of payment. The precise regulations are summarized in Ben-Ishai, ibid.,
at pp. 240-42.
94. See ibid., at pp. 240-41 (summarizing Australian procedures).
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education in law, that the government expects lawyers to contribute
more toward their educations than farmers.95
To be sure, an income-contingent approach is captured indirectly,
albeit poorly, in even the Canadian and American insolvency
regimes. In Canada, the waiting periods before a student debtor can
seek bankruptcy relief could be envisioned as an oblique way to
achieve the same effect. If the concern is a high-income lawyer-to-
be masquerading as a poor recent graduate, then waiting for five
years (or ten years, or seven years as Bill C-55 proposes) could be
seen as a way to smoke out the false debtors.96 After seven years, the
debtor either truly is poor (and so has not been opportunistic), or is
so taken with the deferral of his legal paycheque that he deserves
the discharge for his efforts (he has opportunistically cut off his
nose to spite his face).97
Similarly, the U.S. "undue hardship" test could also be seen as
capturing some income-contingency. Indeed, Pardo and Lacey's
study shows a strong correlation between a judge's determination of
the debtor's future ability to pay his debts (an ability that can be
likened to having an "opportunistic" level of income) and the
absence of undue hardship and hence the nondischargeability of the
debtor's loans.98 Judges use the undue hardship test to back-end
income-contingency into the American system - albeit in an
unpredictable and expensive way.
Thus the prescriptive lesson for the North Americans is that if
they are truly worried about smoking out the future doctors and
combating soft fraud in bankruptcy, a more direct and principled
(and less cumbersome and expensive) route would take a page from
the Oceanic playbook. Moreover, what should be equally clear,
from a theoretical perspective of anti-opportunism,99 is that there
95. See ibid., unpublished Appendix, supra, footnote 65 (citing Australian statistics). This
analysis assumes that lawyers for the most part make more money than farmers, a fact
on which I would bet the farm.
96. See ibid., at pp. 221-24 for a summary of the various Canadian (proposed and actual)
waiting periods.
97. This is not to disagree with Ben-Ishai's well-placed criticism of the seven-year wait-
ing period as inappropriately orienting the presumption of abuse against the debtor:
see ibid.
98. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at pp. 86-87 (noting 94% correlation and
constructing model).
99. And a doctrinal one too, given Pardo and Lacey's historical analysis. See ibid., at
pp. 13-21.
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is little sense to the U.S. cases that deny the discharge of poor
former students, such as the cellist in In re Gerhardt.'0 These cases
do not accept the income-contingent approach - in fact, they reject
it outright, bemoaning that it allows the debtor to get away with
retaining a low income yet discharging his student debt.'0 This
complaint leaves one nonplussed, because it is difficult to fathom
the supposed moral hazard of having a low income when the under-
lying premise of education according a chiefly private benefit is that
it permits the student to earn a higher income stream.
Indeed, this whole line of case law, at least as seen trying to
implement an anti-opportunism theory, seems to rely upon a com-
bination of difficult-to-defend propositions. It either needs a
crabbed interpretation of education (a wholly private endeavor with
no public component whatsoever), or it must subscribe to the notion
that the private "benefit" from education is simply having enjoyed
a few years of not having an honest job, regardless of the income
one gets from it in the future.' 2 The consequence of this reasoning
is to discourage education that requires a hefty tuition load by deny-
ing the discharge if a financial "payoff' does not materialize. Most
troublingly, the reasoning in this case law is not just difficult to
square, but directly opposed, to the anti-opportunistic theory of
nondischargeability. Recall that an anti-opportunism defense of
nondischargeability was cast, in the pitch of the Australian minister,
to prevent an unfair subsidy to the rich (the educated debtors) from
the poor (the uneducated taxpayers).1 °3 Sensibly, the Australians
went to an income-contingent plan to prevent this potential evil
from happening. To withhold the discharge from cellists who make
$1,680 per month seems to abhor not a subsidy from the poor to the
rich but a subsidy from the poor to the poor. Actually, if one
assumes that the tax regime is progressive and the subsidy would be
shouldered predominately by the rich, then the purportedly objec-
tionable subsidy would be from the rich to the poor. If one is
willing to accept progressively redistributive subsidies, this seems to
be an awfully difficult sort of subsidy to begrudge. °4
100. See In re Gerhardt, 348 E3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003), summarized supra, at text accompanying
footnotes 54-56, and discussed infra at text accompanying footnotes 102-103.
101. See supra, footnote 53.
102. A final explanation for this case law is that it is just mean-spirited.
103. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at p. 232 (citing sources).
104. What about the bad cellist, or the cellist who could pay his bills taking a traditional
cellist's job, such as with a symphony orchestra, but instead chooses, for reasons of
10-44 C.B.L.J.
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As for the public fisc and the preservation of the federal student
loan programme through sharpening students' repayment incentives
with nondischargeability, a collection of problems arises. These
problems are quite different from this theory's foundational
assumption of bankruptcy endogeneity (that former students
"chose" to file bankruptcy to deal with their student loans as
opposed to being "compelled" to file by external circumstances)., 5
That assumption is of course required to get this theory out of the
gates, and it is a problematic one, but it has been well explored
elsewhere." 6 The decision to decline repetition of its critique should
not be seen as endorsing the assumption, but rather an attempt to
focus on arguments that have not yet been developed in the literature.
The first difficulty with the "save the student loan programme"
foundation for nondischargeability is partially logical and partially
evidentiary. When scholars fret about the solvency of the student
subjective utility, to play only poorly remunerated "avant-garde" music that involves
rubbing his cello with trout? Isn't his "undue hardship" of his own creation? Isn't he
an opportunist of a different sort? The question is an interesting one. Perhaps there
should be an objectivity component to undue hardship (i.e., consideration of what a
"reasonable cellist" would earn). That might deal with the fish-mongering musician
and yet avoid the one-child policy of Ward v. United States (In re Ward), No. 02-34594-
H4-7 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004), online at <http://weberlaw.com/pdf-files/ward-vs-dept-
of-education-unpublished.pdf>, in which a student loan undue hardship motion was
denied because the economic hardship was a consequence of the debtor's subjective-
utility choice to have a third child. I suspect that a "reasonable parent" would not be
legally required to use birth control (or abortion) to discharge student loans were such
an objective test employed. Reasonable cellists cannot play trout; reasonable parents
can procreate. (I am indulging in the dramatic in likening the Ward holding to a com-
pulsory sterilization regime; the Ward judge actually fashioned creative relief that
granted partial discharge for five years until the mother could go back to work and
alleviate the financial distress, but his reluctant interpretation of his restricted discre-
tion under Gerhardt is chilling.)
105. If, by contrast to this assumption, bankruptcy is largely "exogenous", then there is
little to gain from making student loans nondischargeable. If circumstances beyond the
debtor's control leave him without money to pay back his loans, blood cannot be
drawn from a stone. See generally Till v. SCS Credit, 541 US 465, 493 (2004)
(Thomas J. concurring in the judgment) (cautioning that "bankruptcy judges are not
oracles and ... trustees cannot draw blood from a stone").
106. For a recent and persuasive treatment, see Warren and Tyagi, supra, footnote 3. For
contemporary data undermining the view that debtors strategically consider bankruptcy
laws to calibrate their debt levels from an ex ante perspective, see the report of the
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry, Over-indebtedness Monitoring Paper Q1
2006 (D"). The report (at p. 12) notes that after the Enterprise Act of 2002 - which
made personal insolvency procedures more lenient on debtors but left cognate indivi-
dual voluntary arrangement (ivA) procedures unchanged - the increase in IvAs
actually outstripped the rate of (more debtor-friendly) personal insolvencies.
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loan programme - and more specifically, the need to change the
Bankruptcy Code to save it - they often rely on the spiraling
number of student loans (both outstanding and in default) to demon-
strate a sense of urgency.'01 They also tend to read causality into this
growing number of loans in default, reasoning as follows: there are
more students taking out loans, and more aggregate dollars in
default than previously, and more loans being discharged in bank-
ruptcy, and therefore there is a problem with bankruptcy being too
attractive to students. This imperils the student loan programme's
solvency. 108
The logical problem is reading the growing number of defaulters
and the growing portfolio of loans in default as evincing an overly
lenient bankruptcy system. There may or may not be a problem
(there likely is), but the conclusion that there is a problem with the
bankruptcy system being too lenient in its treatment of student debt
and too lax in its incentives for student debtors from the simple fact
that the numbers of debts and discharges are increasing rests upon
dubious logic.' (Indeed, it reiterates the argument resonating in
general bankruptcy reform that because the total number of bank-
ruptcy filers has increased over the last two decades there is a
problem with the Bankruptcy Code being too lenient on debtors.)" °
A growing number of defaults, on its own, proves nothing about
incentives. All it proves is that more debt is being discharged.
The deeper problem with this focus on increasing total student
debt and defaulted student debt is that it is looking at the wrong
107. Even Ben-Ishai does this a bit. She catalogues a run-up in the number of students who
file for bankruptcy with student loans and the aggregate dollar amount of student loans
discharged through bankruptcy, but she does not report associated rates of tuition
increase or even macro-economic trends. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 229-
31. Then again, some of her data might speak for themselves. For example, she finds
that the New Zealand Auditor General reported a jump to $8.5 million in write-offs
from 542 borrowers versus $3.5 million in write-offs from 326 borrowers in just one
year (June 2003 to June 2004): see ibid. In fairness, Ben-Ishai in her discussion sug-
gests that she is simply reporting the justifications used to restrict dischargeability in
presenting these statistics, not necessarily endorsing them as a basis for intervention:
see ibid., at pp. 235-38.
108. See ibid., at pp. 229-31 and 235-38.
109. Unless the argument is the broader one of funding more generally, which is an impor-
tant question, but not a bankruptcy one. See infra, text accompanying footnote 122.
110. For example, consider the statement on the U.S. Senate Floor of Sen. Jeff Sessions that
"[i]t has been estimated that if current practices continue, one out of every seven
households will have filed for bankruptcy by the end of this decade, with many of
these losses as a result of the misuse of the law by irresponsible, high-income filers":
150 Cong. Rec. H143, H144 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004) (Statement of Sen. Sessions).
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numbers. By focusing on the aggregate dollar amount of dis-
charged student debt, it neglects the more important default rate of
those loans. The confusion is understandable; ceteris paribus, an
increase in the dollar amount of discharged debt usually does mean
an increase in the default rate. But all things are not equal. Tuition
has been skyrocketing at a pace well beyond inflation."' Thus even
if the bankruptcy discharge rate stayed constant per borrower, one
would expect to see an increase in both the number of debtors
defaulting on loans and the aggregate amount of defaulted debts as
more and more teenagers have to take out larger and larger loans to
attend university. Data assembled to show increases in the number
and amount of defaulted student debt on their own tell an incom-
plete story. For the "collections incentives" reasoning of saving the
student loan programme by toughening up on bankruptcy to be per-
suasive, one would have to find data of sensitivity of the default
rate to changes in bankruptcy law.
These data do not appear to be forthcoming. In fact, the General
Accounting Office in the United States reports that while the total
outstanding student loan portfolio swelled from $54 billion to
$233 billion from 1990 to 2001, the default portfolio "only"
doubled during that time (and actually fell in percentage terms) from
$11 billion (20%) to $22 billion (9%).12 Thus the data available
actually suggest that the default rate on all student loans - not just
those that go into bankruptcy as a consequence - has been steadily
falling in the United States. This has been attributed to collection
systems improvements that have taken hold over the past decade."3
These operational improvements, moreover, appear to be wholly
unrelated to the periodic tinkering with the Bankruptcy Code's
nondischargeability provisions, making the nexus between student
loan programme solvency and bankruptcy rules a tenuous one at
best."4
111. Tuition at four-year private colleges has risen from about $15,000 to $21,000 in real
dollars over the past decade: see Trends in College Pricing, supra, footnote 2.
112. See Report to the Secretary of Education, supra, footnote 1, at p. 1 and Table I.
113. See ibid., at p. 6.
114. See ibid. Figure 1 shows that the National Cohort Default Rate declined relatively
steadily throughout the 1990s - not in big drops after bankruptcy law amendments
- from 22.4% in 1990 to 5.9% in 2000. And this is simply the number of loans per
year entering repayment status that fall into default; the loans eventually finding their
way to bankruptcy discharge are necessarily fewer. The General Accounting Office
attributes this success to greater collection procedures, including, for example,
matching data collected by the Internal Revenue Service. Changes to the bankruptcy
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In fairness, one could accept all these data and conclude that
there is no epidemic of student laxity in defaulting on loans through
an overly attractive bankruptcy system, yet still have an overall
concern about the solvency of the student loan programme. In other
words, that the default rate is good does not mean it could not be
better; that students are working hard to pay their loans does not
mean they could not be working harder given the proper incentives.
(This argument still runs into the seeming insensitivity of student
default rates to changes in the bankruptcy laws, but let us accept for
the moment, arguendo, the possibility of a salutary role bankruptcy
law could play in influencing student conduct.)
The problem, if one follows this reasoning, is that the current
treatment under U.S. law then becomes irrationally lenient. The law
should not stop at nondischargeability, but proceed to deploy other
levers available within a personal insolvency regime to maximize
payments to a desired creditor (here, the student loan programme).
Carrying this thinking through to its conclusion renders inexplicable
the U.S. Code's reliance on dischargeability alone in dealing with
educational debt. There are at least two other routinely employed
bankruptcy mechanisms that could affect the treatment of student
debt (as with any debt): priority and provability.
When a creditor enjoys priority, he receives favored distribution out
of the finite assets of the debtor's estate. For example, certain family
law creditors in the United States receive both priority payout,"5 and
nondischargeability of debt, "6 thus according them maximal bank-
ruptcy protection: what the trustee gets his hands on, the creditors get
priority in, and what remains owing is not discharged. By contrast,
student debt receives nondischargeability status only, but, curiously,
no priority. The consequence of this treatment is a law that is only
partially helpful to the favored creditor and a windfall to the debtor's
other unsecured creditors, who avoid having the estate depleted by
priority claims."7
laws do not receive credit: see ibid. (The default rates of the total loan portfolio do
show some interesting trends which could, with a stretch, be linked to changes in the
bankruptcy law lagged by a few years, but this is based only on a crude eyeballing of
the numbers, requires some flexibility with defining the time lag, necessitates the
explaining-away of an outlier, and has no macro-economic data adjustment! I thus
raise this point for diehard readers only; I do not suggest it should inform the analy-
sis. If inclined, see the General Accounting Office Report's Table I at p. 7.)
115. See II U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
116. See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
117. The unsecured creditors' windfall comes at the debtor's expense. The debtor would
prefer to maximize his estate's payment of the nondischargeable debts for which he
will remain responsible after bankruptcy.
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Provability often gets forgotten in American circles, likely due to
the 1978 Code's expansive definition of "claim"."' When debts are
not provable in bankruptcy, they are wholly unaffected by the pro-
ceedings (and, necessarily, not discharged). Thus student debt, as
provable in a bankruptcy case in the United States, can theoretically
be paid down by a debtor's estate after any priority debt has been
extinguished, pro rata with other unsecured debt. By contrast,
unprovable debt does not get paid at all; excess money in the estate
goes to other unsecured creditors of the debtor. This is how the
United Kingdom now treats educational debt - not just non-
dischargeable but unprovable altogether."9 Thus dischargeability,
priority and provability all play roles in a personal insolvency
system in affecting the recovery of a favored creditor.
Considering these other bankruptcy mechanisms in light of pro-
tecting the loan programme's solvency as the justification for
nondischargeability, the suggestion tentatively made by Ben-Ishai
in reflecting on her study's findings, that student loan debts should
not be provable in bankruptcy, is unpersuasive.'2 ° Why should they
not be? The argument put forth in government reports accompany-
ing bankruptcy reforms that drop provability in the face of nondis-
chargeability is that it is "unfair" to the other unsecured creditors to
leave student loans provable but nondischargeable. 2' That just begs
the question. Why is it unfair? It is only unfair if one supposes that
the status quo of nondischargeability-but-provability allows the
favored creditor (here, the government student loan programme) to
win "too much" in bankruptcy. But if one returns to the foundation
that justifies the favored treatment - fear of the solvency of the
student loan programme - one should not care about the other
unsecured creditors, let alone worry that their treatment is unfair.
On the contrary, their sacrifice of foregone benefit will bolster the
student loan programme's solvency even further. In fact, this
"solvency protection" model logically suggests one should accord
the government priority in its education debt recovery as well. That
would help the student loan programme solvency even more.
118. See II U.S.C. § 101(5).
119. See Higher Education Act 2004 (U.K.), 2004, c. 8, s. 42, reg. 39.
120. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 240-42. This is actually only one of her reflec-
tions. Her principal conclusion - which is persuasive - is that nondischargeability
of student loans is not worth the candle and should be abolished altogether: see ibid.
121. See ibid. (discussing the United Kingdom and Australia).
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So perhaps, to complete this thinking, subsidized student loans
should become priority debts as well as nondischargeable ones.
This would maximize the protection accorded the public student
loan programme. In fact, maybe the undue hardship safety valve
should be abolished altogether, so as to protect the programme even
further. After all, if more repayment money can be squeezed out of
student loan debtors in bankruptcy, it will necessarily add to the
coffers of the student loan programme. There is theoretical
consistency to this analysis, to be sure. But is this a fix? (And if it
is, is it a fair one?) Consider that one way to bolster the solvency of
the Social Security programme would be to make debtors who file
for bankruptcy forfeit their Social Security benefits. It would cer-
tainly save money for the Social Security programme. Would it,
however, be a fix, given the numbers involved? Doubtful. Would it
be fair? Even more doubtful.
Returning to reality, the real problem, especially in light of the
remoteness of bankruptcy law on student loan programmes, is the
affordability of post-secondary education. In countries like Canada,
where student tuition rates are being deliberately raised so the pri-
vate-public sharing of education financing can be readjusted more
toward the private side, the increase in student debt should not come
as either a source of alarm or concern; it is an intended consequence.
By contrast, in the United States, where tuition rates have been creep-
ing upward consistently over years, the problem of student loan
defaults should be raising larger questions about the cost of higher
education and the appropriate role of government funding. That is a
more important (and more difficult) task than tinkering with the
Bankruptcy Code's discharge rules. Addressing higher education
affordability concerns by rejiggering the bankruptcy laws is throwing
a thimble of water on a conflagration. And the fire is afoot - indeed,
the decision in the United States to reduce funding to the federal
student loan programmes as part of the always unpleasant task of
budget-tightening may be fanning those flames.'
Finally, as for the extension of nondischargeability to private
loans, as the 2005 amendments to the U.S. Code do, it creates yet
another disconnect between theory and law. How is the public fisc
protected by subsidizing private lenders? To be sure, allowing
nondischargeability for loans granted by private lenders should
122. See Chaker, supra, footnote 4, at p. D1. Note that state budgets are cutting student loan
funding too. See Mark F. Smith, "Growing Expenses, Shrinking Resources: The States
and Higher Education", Academe, July-August 2004.
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theoretically lower the cost of capital for would-be students, but
there is again a poor fit with the data that suggest an already low
bankruptcy rate of student loans. 23 Absent data indicating a problem,
one runs the risk, as the banker's association warned, of just playing
favorites in the lobbying game.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has explored a handful of theoretical justifications for
treating student debt as nondischargeable in bankruptcy. It has
doubtless missed some. But in critiquing this collection of possible
theories, it suggests that the most attractive ones seem to be the
ones least reflected in many of the current bankruptcy laws, just as
the ones most recognizable in today's statutes seem grounded in
confusion and myth.
The theory that comes closest to persuasion as to why student
loans should have restricted dischargeability in bankruptcy is that of
the opportunistic debtor, "softly" defrauding the system if she walks
away from publicly subsidized debt that enables a high-income
career. Its most principled implementation in a bankruptcy system
would be through the adoption of an income-contingent model of
debt repayment, as occurs in New Zealand (and even that most likely
fights a phantom menace given the lack of hard evidence linking
students to abuse).
Unlike the overly broad U.S. approach, which lops all students
together as presumptive frauds, the income-contingent one would
separate debtors who earn more from those who earn less, progres-
sively extracting more payment from the more financially success-
ful. It would be both consistent with the most persuasive theory of
nondischargeability and undistorted by the baseless spectre of
moral hazard. In addition to being attractive theoretically, income-
contingency could also help a troubling trend. Apparently certain
"sub-prime" schools target a financially vulnerable client base by
upselling classes and educational programmes of dubious worth,
confident that they will have repayment leverage through non-dis-
chargeability in bankruptcy.'24 An income-contingent approach
might dry up this unwelcome market.
123. See General Accounting Office Report, supra, footnote 18.
124. See Pardo and Lacey, supra, footnote 14, at p. 41 (citing "fraud, waste and abuse vis-
ited upon the student loan program by some vocational and trade schools" as one
determinant for findings that more than one quarter of student loan debtors in their
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As for whether the income contingency should be rule-based and
administered by tax officials or discretion-based and administered
ex post by judges, Pardo and Lacey's study should give us pause
about how income contingency is incorporated on the back end in
American law. While the glass may be half full because income-
contingency is seemingly incorporated, it is also at least half empty,
because the implementation of the principle seems worrisomely
arbitrary and expensive. Before one leaps to the conclusion that
bright-line rules would improve upon vague standards, as many,
such as Ben-Ishai, want to do,'25 consider what some perceive to be
the unsatisfactory imposition of straightjackets on judges under the
2005 consumer bankruptcy amendments in the United States. 126
The Ben-Ishai study makes a broad conclusion about the conver-
gence of legal systems toward more unified bankruptcy treatment of
educational debt. This is only partially correct. One must equally
remember how fundamentally different the conception of higher
education may be in the United States from Canada. The private
benefit of education is the starting point for discussion in American
bankruptcy opinions and often the ending point. By contrast, the
Canadian history of having every university subsidized by the
government and tuition set like utility rates may well have led to
deep-seated differences in approach that may not unravel so quick-
ly. That may be the reason why Canadian law treats student debtors
much more generously than American law, such as by allowing
relief after a period of years. Or it could be different public choice
factors; for example, more of the Canadian population than the
American has obtained post-secondary education per capita, so it
could be that the proportionate political constituency of erstwhile
university students is stronger. 27 Whatever the reason, while there
may be convergence in some areas, the two systems are likely fur-
ther apart than commentators such as Ben-Ishai suggest (or worry).
What remains distressingly clear, however, is that both systems
are still struggling to design a coherent treatment of student loans in
study bankrupted by higher education loans did not even earn an undergraduate
degree); see also Edelson, supra, footnote 41 (discussing Senate investigation).
125. See Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 9.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (as revised, 2005).
127. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Education at a
Glance 2005: OECO Indicator 2005 (Chart A1.3: Population that has attained tertiary
education (2003)) (Canada ranked first; United States ranked eighth, between Belgium
and Ireland), online at <http://www.oecd.org/document/ll1/0,2340,en-2649-37455-
35321099 1_1 1 37455,00.html>.
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personal insolvency built upon theory and data rather than stereo-
type and speculation. While the United States seems to be moving
in the wrong direction (and chose to ignore the recommendation of
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission), Canada is at least
talking of change and moving in the right one. This indeed seems to
be not just a divergence, but a welcome one. Perhaps this article's
attempt to put together the various theories of nondischargeability
and sort the good from the bad will help those truly interested in
principled legal reform.
